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Introduction
Since the first use of modern chemical weapons in World War I, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) have
improved drastically in lethality and longevity. These advances in weapons production, coupled with civilian
industries that can be rapidly converted to produce these weapons, provide a serious concern to the future of
global security. For these reasons, further action is needed by stakeholders, specifically the United Nations (UN) 
and global superpowers, to curtail the development, proliferation, and WMDs utilization, for both domestic and
international peace and prosperity. Following are two ways the future security of WMDs can be addressed by
the aforementioned stakeholders:
• Maintain status quo with current treaties and preventive measures
• Revamp arms treaties and ensure there are consequences for violations
Each of these issues is described and discussed in this brief. To understand the gravity of the policy decisions
that must be made in regard to WMDs, we present a brief background, WMDs’ risks and benefits, maintaining
the status quo of WMD policy, and offer policy alternatives and recommendations.
Scope of the Problem
Today, certain WMDs are easier to obtain than ever. Unlike nuclear weapons, which
require significant investment and knowledge to be created, Chemical and
Biological WMDs can easily be made by repurposing civilian facilities [1].
Consequently, these two WMDs can deliver serious damage to both the
personnel caught in the weapons deployment and the environment
[1]. As the use of these weapons increases, namely by developing
 and non-state actors, we must determine what
countermeasures must be taken to deter this erroneous
behavior, because there will continue to be threats in the
future.
Among the history of WMDs use, international treaties and
protocols leading to the limitation of testing and usage have
followed, which many nations follow extensively.
Organizations created through  the United Nations Office of
Disarmament Affairs or by national entities have achieved the
nations
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safe disposal of many of the world's WMDs. 
Additionally, meetings with other WMDs users 
created agreements on limitations towards the 
deadliest weapons in the world [2]. 
Despite these advancements, there are still 
problems related to WMDs. While most nations 
adhere to the documents banning WMDs use on 
the battlefield, some nations do not abide by 
these conventions and further increase and 
sophisticate their stockpiles [3]. This disregard 
for the law, coupled with production of WMDs, 
has led to use of such weapons via terrorist 
attacks and by rogue, developing nations, with 
few consequences for the violators. 
Risks and Benefits 
The risks posed by these weapons remain 
extensive. All three forms of WMDs lay in the 
surrounding areas of effect for long periods of 
time, affecting both the civilian populace inside 
of the area and in the environment, in some 
cases causing irreparable damage to the 
ecosystem. These problems, in turn, cause 
economic and political difficulties for the nations 
affected by these weapons. 
While the risks of WMDs in the world are high, 
WMDs also have some level of benefit. With 
close monitoring and control of WMD arsenals 
worldwide, they have served as a dissuasion 
from further large scale or worldwide conflicts, 
as the threat of mutually assured destruction has 
influenced many powerful nations. Possession of 
these weapons allows smaller nation-states to 
have more authority internationally and given 
them bargaining power to prevent larger nations 
from political or military imposition. 
The ethics of using WMDs remain fiercely 
debated, as examples show long lasting effects 
that came from their destructive powers. 
Furthermore, most nations wish to liberate the 
world of such weapons as a means to ensure 
protection to both civilians and the environment 
alike [2]. Unfortunately, most nations who 
possess a WMD do not wish to rid themselves of 
the weapon, for a plethora of reasons, such as 
politically or for security. Fortunately, the 
utilization of these weapons has happened only 
a few times, and treaties and retaliation fears 
have driven wielders to keep the weapons on 
standby. 
WMDs retain an immense cost for the upkeep 
and maintenance required to maintain optimal 
use [4]. The funds for upkeep of such weapons 
can put serious strain on nations with limited 
capacities in place. Moreover, containment 
breaches of the material in WMDs have shown 
to cause more serious consequences than the 
usage of the weapons themselves [5]. The 
majority of these consequences are 
environmentally and economically challenging, 
as civilian displacement and decontamination of 
the impacted area is expensive, while seriously 
detrimental to the wildlife surrounding the areas 
[6]. 
In order to curtail the destruction of both lives 
and land areas, more interventions and 
inspections of nations is required. Inspections of 
all nations’ facilities with the capacity to create 
WMDs should be done without question or 
hindrance for the betterment of society, and 
reports should be open on what nations control 
which WMDs. Interventions for WMD 
deterrence, such as harsh economic sanctions 
and possible international ultimatums, may be 
needed to stop rogue actors. 
Current Policy: Maintaining the 
Status Quo 
Currently, there is the option to maintain 
existing levels of WMD security and monitoring. 
There has been very limited WMD usage in 
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in a large-scale conflict. In addition, proliferation 
of WMDs is very low due to vigilant security of 
stockpiles and the secrets that could lead to 
weapons creation. Overall, the status quo may 
be the best way to address WMD security in the 
future because it has worked, and the 
international community is familiar with the 
current guidelines. 
Chemical Weapons 
Chemical weapons’ current policy is more than 
adequate for eliminating stockpiles. The 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993 
called for and led to the elimination of chemical 
weapons from most nation’s stockpiles. The 
United States is the only country which has 
complied and still is in the process of dismantling 
their remaining chemical weapons. However, 
some nations, such as Syria, do not offer full 
transparency into their arsenal and are assumed 
to have chemical weapons [7]. Guidelines stated 
at the CWC should be applied more rigorously to 
Syria and other nations in order to ensure 
complete compliance. 
Biological Weapons 
Biological weapons are also banned from 
nations’ arsenals. However, current policy allows 
for countries to continue researching biological 
weapons to counter any potential attacks, 
whether from another enemy nation or a 
terrorist group. Similar to chemical weapons, 
biological weapons have not been used by a 
nation in conflict for a long time and are almost 
exclusively weapons of terrorist groups or rogue 
nations [8]. Current standards appear effective 
for keeping biological weapons off the battlefield 
and in the lab, for now as well as in the future. 
Nuclear Weapons 
Nuclear weapons are highly debated due to their 
destructive power and use in real conflict (as 
compared to other WMDs.) There are a number 
of policies and treaties which attempt to limit 
nuclear arsenals and their continued 
proliferation. The United Nations has many laws 
which are largely symbolic, but the United States 
and Russia have the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START) treaty, which reduced the two 
nations’ nuclear arsenals since the end of the 
Cold War [9]. Other nations, such as India and 
Pakistan, have treaties. While agreements may 
not be as comprehensive and all-encompassing 
for completely removing nuclear weapons, 
nuclear weapons have not been used during war 
since 1945. 
Policy Alternatives and 
Recommendation 
While current policies have prevented recent 
use and proliferation of WMDs by major powers, 
the global situation is constantly evolving. 
Chemical weapons were used by some nations in 
smaller conflicts and on their own people [10], 
biologicals can potentially be weaponized by 
nations studying their effects, and nuclear 
weapon treaties are not effective or consistent 
enough to apply to every nation. Because of 
these issues, there must be some change and 
evolution in the policies that govern WMDs to 
preserve security of countries around the world. 
Current policy needs to be granted more 
support, making the enforcement more 
effective. The Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) should have greater 
authority to go into countries to examine their 
stockpiles and current chemical weapon 
research. This examination would prevent rogue 
nations from secretly building stockpiles and 
using WMDs on their citizens or adversaries. 
Greater transparency should also be applied to 
biological weapons research. While countries 
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attacks, an independent commission should be 
able to examine each country’s program to 
ensure no research into weaponizing is 
occurring. Lastly, nuclear treaties need to have 
greater enforcement. Current UN laws have little 
to no backing and punishment for violating 
treaties has no power. With China, North Korea, 
and Iran increasing their nuclear arsenals, 
sanctions should be imposed for not complying 
with weapons limitations as well as any 
proliferation of secrets or technology. 
Conclusion 
Usage of WMDs leads to unimaginable and 
horrifying consequences, especially as 
technology continues to develop the weapons’ 
lethality. Whether it is the environment, 
economic, or societal costs, the destruction 
caused is astronomical. For these reasons, it 
should be in the interest of all nations to enforce 
limitations on possessors of WMDs, inspections 
towards all nations for any possible violations of 
international agreements towards WMDs, and 
serious repercussions for rule violators. This can 
be done by giving the United Nations more 
power and resources to combat rogue actors and 
thwart any possible use of these weapons. 
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